Now about our staff work and procedures. There are clear procedures of staff work laid down at all levels. The enquiry has however revealed that much more attention will have to be given, than was done in the past, in the work and procedures of the General Staff at the Services Headquarters, as well as in the Command Headquarters and below, to long-term operational planning, including logistics as well as to the problems of co-ordination between various Services Headquarters. So one major lesson learnt is that the quality of General Staff Work and the depth of its prior planning in time is going to be one of the most crucial factors in our future preparedness.

That brings me to the next point which is called the higher direction of operations. Even the largest and the best equipped of Armies need to be given proper policy guidance and major directives by the Government, whose instrument it is. These must bear a reasonable relation to the size of the Army and state of its equipment from time to time. An increase in the size or improving the equipment of Army not only costs money but also needs time.

The reverses that our Armed Forces admittedly suffered were due to a variety of causes and weaknesses as stated above. While this Enquiry has gone deeply into those causes it has also confirmed that the attack was so sudden and in such remote and isolated sectors that the Indian Army as a whole was really not tested. In that period of less than two months last year, only about 24,000 of our troops were actually involved in fighting. Of course, those in Ladakh did an excellent job even when overwhelmed and outnumbered. In the Eastern-most Sector though the troops had to withdraw in the face of vastly superior enemy strength from Walong, they withdrew in an orderly manner and took their toll. It was only in the Kameng Sector that the Army suffered a series of reverses. These battles were fought on our remotest borders and were at heights not known to the Army and at places which geographically had all the disadvantages for our troops and many advantages for the enemy. But such initial reverses are a part of the tides of war and what matters most is who wins the last battle.

Before I end, I would like to add a word about the famous Fourth Division which took part in these operations. It is indeed sad that this famous Division had to sacrifice its good name in these series of reverses. It is still sadder that this Division during the actual operations was only Fourth Division in name, for it was not fighting with its original formations in tact. Troops from different formations had to he rushed to the borders to fight under the banner of the Fourth Division, while the original formations of the Division itself were deployed elsewhere. I am confident, and I am sure the House would share with me that the famous Fourth Division would live to win many more battles if there is any future aggression against our country.

Before I conclude, I would like to mention that we have certainly not waited for this Report to be in our hands to take corrective action. The process of taking corrective action had started simultaneously with institution of this Enquiry and the House would recollect that I had informed it of the same.