SECTION 2 - ( CHAPTER 5)

STATEMENT REGARDING THE NEFA ENQUIRY

Rajya Sabha, 2 September 1963

EDITORIAL NOTE

On 2 September 1963, Shri Y. B. Chavan made a Statement on NEFA Enquiry in Rajya Sabha and on the same day laid a Statement in Lok Sabha.

On the same day, he made a Statement in both the Houses on ‘Our Defence Preparedness.’

He replied to the debate in Rajya Sabha on 20 September 1963 and Lok Sabha on 21 September 1963.

Sir, I wish to inform the House of the results of the Enquiry to investigate our reverses in the operations occasioned by the Chinese aggression across our Northern borders during the months of October-November, 1962.

Though the Officers appointed to enquire into these reverses were asked to examine the operations with particular reference to the Kameng Division of NEFA, they quite rightly came to the conclusion that the developments in NEFA were closely corelated to those in Ladakh and their study of NEFA operations had to he carried out in conjunction with developments and operations in the Ladakh Sector. Thus, the enquiry made and the conclusions emerging from it are results of study into the entire operations on our Northern borders.

As I had informed the House on 1st April, in reply to a question in Lok Sabha, with my approval the Chief of Army Staff had ordered a thorough investigation to be carried out to find as to what was wrong with

(i)    our training;

(ii)    our equipment;

(iii)    our system of command;"

(iv)    the physical fitness of our troops; and

(v)    the capacity of our Commanders at all levels to influence the men under them.

While conveying to the House the terms of reference of this Enquiry, I had made it clear that the underlying idea in holding this Enquiry is to derive military lessons. It was meant to bring out clearly what were the mistakes or deficiencies in the past, so as to ensure that in future such mistakes are not repeated and such deficiencies are quickly made. Consequently, the Enquiring Officers had to study in great and intimate detail the extent of our preparedness at the time, the planning and strategic concepts behind it and the way those plans were adjusted in the course of operations. This also necessitated the examination of the developments and events prior to hostilities as also the plans, posture and the strength of the Army at the outbreak of hostility. In the course of the Enquiry a very detailed review of the actual operations in both the sectors had to he carried out with reference to terrain, strategy, tactics and deployment of our troops.