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Speeches in Parliament Vol. (I)-51

The Enquiry has revealed that there is certainly need for toughening and battle inoculation. It is, therefore, essential that battle schools are opened at Training Centres and formations, so that gradual toughening and battle inoculation can be carried out.

It has also revealed that the main aspect of training as well as the higher Commanders’ concept of mountain warfare requires to he put right.

Training alone, however, without correct leadership will pay little dividends. Thus, the need of the moment, above all else, is training in leadership.

The second question was about our equipment. The Enquiry has confirmed that there was indeed an overall shortage of equipment both for training and during operations. But it was not always the case that particular equipment was not available at all with Armed Forces anywhere in the country. The crucial difficulty in many cases was that, while the equipment could be reached to the last point in the plains or even beyond it, it was another matter to reach it in time, mostly by air or by animal or human transport, to the forward formations, who took the brunt of fighting. This position of logistics was aggravated by two factors :

(i)    The fast rate which troops had to be inducted, mostly from plains to high mountain areas; and

(ii)    Lack of properly built roads and other means of communications.

This situation was aggravated and made worse because of overall shortage as far as vehicles were concerned and as our fleet was too old and its efficiency not adequate for operating on steep gradients and mountain terrain.

Thus, in brief, though the enquiry revealed overall shortage of equipment, it has also revealed that our weapons were adequate to fight the Chinese and compared favourably with theirs. The automatic rifle would have helped in the cold climate and is being introducted. The enquiry has pinpointed the need to make up deficiency in equipment, particularly suited for mountain warfare, but more so to provide means and modes of communication to make it available to the troops at the right place, at the right time. Work on these lines has already been taken in hand and is progressing vigorously.

The third question is regarding our system of command, with the Armed Forces. The enquiry has revealed that there is basically nothing wrong with the system and chain of command, provided it is exercised in accepted manner at various levels. There is, however, need for realisation of responsibilities at various levels, which must work with trust and confidence in each other. It is also revealed that during the operations, difficulties arose only when there was departure from accepted chain of command. There again, such departures occurred mainly due to haste and lack of adequate prior planning.

The enquiry has also revealed the practice that crept in higher army formations of interfering in tactical details even to the extent of detailing troops for specified tasks. It is the duty of Commanders in the field to make on the spot decisions, when so required and details of operations ought to have been left to them.